QUICKY DIGEST: Ochoa vs. G & S Transport

HEIRS OF JOSE MARCIAL K. OCHOA namely: RUBY B. OCHOA, MICAELA B. OCHOA and JOMAR B. OCHOA, petitioners, vs. G & S TRANSPORT CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No. 170071. March 9, 2011.

  • Avis Taxicab
  • There is a contract of carriage between G & S and Jose Marcial, hence, G & S is bound to carry Jose Marcial safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.
  • The acquittal of Padilla in the criminal case is immaterial to the instant case for breach of contract since a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.

Comments

Post a Comment

Popular posts from this blog

QUICKY DIGEST: MOF vs. Shin Yang

MOF COMPANY, INC., petitioner, vs. SHIN YANG BROKERAGE CORPORATION, respondent. G.R. No. 172822. December 18, 2009. Secondhand Cars – Freight Collect A consignee, although not a signatory to the contract of carriage between the shipper and the carrier, becomes a party to the contract by reason of either: o     the relationship of agency between the consignee and the shipper/consignor; o     the unequivocal acceptance of the bill of lading delivered to the consignee, with full knowledge of its contents; or o     availment of the stipulation pour autrui, i.e., when the consignee, a third person, demands before the carrier the fulfillment of the stipulation made by the consignor/shipper in the consignee's favor, specifically the delivery of the goods/cargoes shipped. Therefore, Shin Yang, as the consignee although not a signatory to the bill of lading, is bound by the stipulations thereof.  
Read more

QUICKY DIGEST: Sps. Parena vs. CA

SPOUSES TEODORO and NANETTE PEREÑA, petitioners, vs. SPOUSES NICOLAS and TERESITA L. ZARATE, PHILIPPINE NATIONAL RAILWAYS, and the COURT OF APPEALS, respondents. G.R. No. 157917. August 29, 2012. Transporting Students Parena and PNR are jointly and severally liable because both of them are negligent. Despite catering to a limited clientèle, the Pereñas operated as a common carrier because they held themselves out as a ready transportation indiscriminately to the students of a particular school living within or near where they operated the service and for a fee. The Pereñas were liable for the death of Aaron despite the fact that their driver might have acted beyond the scope of his authority or even in violation of the orders of the common carrier.  PNR did not ensure the safety of others through the placing of crossbars, signal lights, warning signs, and other permanent safety barriers to prevent vehicles or pedestrians from crossing there.
Read more